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Potential Pilot Problems:  
Treatment Spillovers in Financial Regulatory Experiments 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The total effect of a regulatory change consists of direct effects and indirect effects (spillovers), 
but the standard difference-in-difference approach measures only direct effects and ignores 
potential indirect effects. By examining the short-sale aggressiveness during the 2007 full repeal 
of the uptick rule by the SEC, we find that short sellers become much more aggressive across the 
board, even in control stocks where the uptick rule is already suspended, which is consistent with 
positive and significant indirect effects on control stocks. In contrast, for the 2005 partial uptick 
repeal, short sellers become more aggressive in treatment stocks without an uptick rule, and less 
aggressive in control stocks with an uptick rule in place, which is consistent with negative indirect 
effects. We provide supportive evidence that the positive indirect effects in 2007 might be driven 
by aggressive broad list-based shorting, which includes both control and treatment stocks, and the 
negative indirect effects in 2005 might result from substitutions between control and treatment 
stocks. We conclude that regulatory pilot designers should carefully consider potential spillovers. 
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1. Introduction 
Many financial regulatory policy changes are hard to study.  For example, new rules are 
typically imposed on all firms at once.  To gauge the effects of a new regime, a particularly useful 
approach for the regulator is to test out a new policy by conducting a randomized experiment.  
Randomized controlled trials are considered to be the gold standard for drawing unambiguous 
statistical conclusions about the effects of a rule change.  By dividing firms or individuals into 
treatment and control groups at random, it becomes possible to isolate the average effects of the 
regulatory change by comparing average outcomes for the two groups.   
In this paper, we highlight some of the pitfalls associated with even well-designed, 
essentially random pilot programs.  We show that the total effect of a regulatory change can be 
decomposed into a direct effect and an indirect effect, or so-called a “spillover”.  Standard 
econometric techniques, such as difference-in-difference approaches, measure only the direct 
effect and may lead to the wrong conclusions.  Indirect effects are due to externalities of some sort, 
where treatments have indirect effects on the control group.  For instance, Miguel and Kremer 
(2004) face this issue in conducting randomized trials of various treatments to reduce worm 
infections in humans. The treated individual benefits from the direct effect of taking the drug, but 
treated individuals are also less likely to infect others in the same village.  Thus, untreated 
individuals in the same Kenyan village (the control group) also benefit from the treatment. This is 
an indirect effect or a spillover. Standard econometric techniques normally assume that the control 
group is unaffected, so a different econometric approach is required to assess these indirect effects. 
Our subject for studying the indirect and direct effects of randomized regulation is the 
Regulation SHO pilot program conducted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from 
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2005 to 2007. On the NYSE, short sale price tests are also known as the “uptick rule.” 1  The uptick 
rule requires short sales to take place on a strict uptick (at a price strictly higher than the last sale 
price) or on a zero-plus tick (where the price is equal to the last sale price but the most recent price 
change is positive).2  The uptick rule was designed to limit shorting in declining markets, but after 
the minimum tick was narrowed to a penny in 2001, the uptick rule became a much smaller 
impediment to shorting.  Also, as trading volumes exploded in the increasingly decentralized U.S. 
equity markets, it became more difficult for trading venues to ensure that a given short sale in fact 
took place on an uptick. 
On July 28, 2004, as part of the adoption of Regulation SHO, a number of changes to short-
sale regulations were announced, including a pilot program to suspend short sale price tests in 
1,000 essentially randomly chosen stocks, namely every third stock in Russell 3000 index ranked 
by volume.  The pilot program took effect in May 2005, and was expressly designed to allow the 
commission to study the effectiveness of the rule.  We refer to this 2005 event as the “2005 partial 
uptick repeal”. Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) study the 
2005 partial uptick repeal and conclude that suspending the uptick rule has modest effects on bid-
ask spreads and other measures of market quality.  Both papers also predict that short-sellers would 
be more aggressive after the uptick rule is removed, but due to data limitations, these papers can 
provide only supportive rather than direct evidence.  
On June 13, 2007, the SEC announced plans to eliminate all short sale price tests, effective 
July 6, 2007. We refer to this event as the “2007 full uptick repeal,” and it is the focus of our paper. 
                                                 
1 Short sale price tests of a different form were also present in Nasdaq-trade stocks. But as noted by Diether, Lee, and 
Werner (2009), the price tests for Nasdaq-traded stocks could be easily circumvented.  For this reason, we focus on 
the uptick rule as it applies to NYSE-listed stocks. 
2 See Jones (2012) for more details and an analysis of the introduction of the uptick rule and other U.S. short sale 
regulatory changes that took place in the 1930’s. 
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We have access to detailed quote and order submission data, which allows us to construct direct 
measures of shorting aggressiveness. The uptick rule directly limits the aggressiveness of short 
sellers, and thus shorting aggressiveness is the cleanest laboratory for our methodological 
investigation into direct and indirect effects of the rule change.  Unconditionally, the full repeal 
frees short sellers from the requirement to trade passively as liquidity providers, so we expect 
shorting aggressiveness to increase after the full repeal.  Starting with standard econometric 
techniques, we find that the short-sellers become significantly more aggressive in non-pilot stocks 
(the treatment stocks) after the 2007 uptick repeal, as expected. More interestingly, we find that 
short sellers become much more aggressive, and shorting activity increases substantially, for all 
stocks, even for the pilot stocks (the control stocks) where the uptick rule had been suspended 
since 2005. This is consistent with a positive spillover or a positive indirect effect.  
One potential explanation for the positive indirect effect in 2007 is that the full uptick 
repeal might enable aggressive, liquidity-demanding short sales of broad stock portfolios, such as 
index arbitrage. Broad stock portfolios, such as stock market indexes, normally include both pilot 
and non-pilot stocks. The removal of the uptick rule for all stocks in 2007 makes synchronous 
portfolio trading much easier and less costly to execute, and that is likely why we observe increases 
in short-selling aggressiveness for both pilot and non-pilot stocks. Using intra-day data on stock 
returns and shorting activity measures, we directly examine the comovements between pilot and 
non-pilot stocks for 2007. We find that shorting activity and returns on non-pilot stocks co-move 
significantly more with pilot stocks right after the 2007 full uptick repeal, which supports the 
broad-portfolio trading hypothesis.  
What happens for the full repeal in 2007 is in sharp contrast to what happens for the partial 
repeal in 2005. When the shorting restrictions disappear for one-third of stocks (the pilot stocks) 
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in the Russell 3000 index in 2005, broad market short-selling remains relatively expensive to 
execute. With lower shorting cost on the pilot stocks than non-pilot stocks, we expect aggressive 
short-sellers to shift toward pilot stocks and away from non-pilot stocks. This substitution might 
increase the short aggressiveness towards treatment stocks (the pilot stocks), and reduces the short 
aggressiveness towards control stocks (the non-pilot stocks), which is consistent with a negative 
indirect effect.3 We find substantial decreases in short-selling aggressiveness among the non-pilot 
stocks after the 2005 repeal, which indicates negative indirect effect. By examining the intra-day 
comovement in shorting and returns between pilot and non-pilot stocks after the 2005 partial 
repeal, we find that the shorting activity and return on non-pilot stocks co-move significantly less 
with pilot stocks after the partial repeal, which supports the substitution hypothesis that short-
sellers favor pilot stocks over non-pilot stocks after the repeal. 
Our paper is built on the literature studying the “stable unit treatment value assumption” 
(SUTVA). The SUTVA assumption is also referred to as the non-interference assumption, 
equivalent to assuming an indirect effect of zero. Many textbooks, such as Wooldridge (2010), 
discuss this issue. The importance of assuming “non-interference” (or SUTVA) when interpreting 
randomized experiments goes back to at least Rubin (1978) and has since been discussed in many 
specific settings, such as Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), Heckman, Lochner, and Taber 
(1998), and Miguel and Kremer (2004). However, the SUTVA assumption is often overlooked by 
researchers in finance. In this paper, we build on the SUTVA literature and provide strong evidence 
that spillovers might exist and could be important in the context of changes in the uptick rule in 
2005 and 2007.  
                                                 
3 Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006) find a similar spillover around the initiation of the TRACE 
reporting system. 
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Our paper is related to previous studies on uptick rule changes, such as Alexander and 
Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009). There are two major differences between 
our paper and Alexander and Peterson (2008) and Diether, Lee and Werner (2009). First, both of 
these papers focus on the 2005 partial uptick repeal, while we mainly examine the 2007 full uptick 
repeal. We also show that the SUTVA assumption might be violated in fundamentally different 
ways in 2007 vs. 2005. Second, both of the above papers focus on market quality measures, such 
as spreads, price impacts, volume, and volatility measures. We still examine these market quality 
measures for completeness, but our main focus is on short-selling activity, especially in terms of 
aggressiveness. We choose to concentrate on short-sale aggressiveness because we want to identify 
the specific changes in trading behavior associated with the regulations, and aggressiveness is a 
direct measure of short-selling activity and a strategic response to the regulation change.  
To summarize, our study provides three unique contributions.  First, we study how the 
2007 full repeal of the uptick rule affect short-sale aggressiveness, and we show that the indirect 
effect is positive and significant. This means that a standard difference-in-difference analysis will 
understate the influence of the tick rule on shorting aggressiveness. Second, we provide supportive 
evidence on the source of the positive indirect effect by examining the comovement of intraday 
shorting activity and returns. We find that the 2007 full repeal leads to more comovement in 
shorting activity and returns between pilot and non-pilot stocks, consistent with more broad market 
list-based trading after the repeal. Third, we also investigate the 2005 partial repeal, and find an 
opposite negative indirect effect, which can be possibly attributed to substitution between 
treatment and control stocks. In this case, a standard difference-in-difference approach would 
overstate the effect of the rule change.  
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Our study has two limitations. First, we define direct and indirect effects using our own 
specifications of what affects short aggressiveness around the regulation events. By doing so, there 
is a risk of mis-specification. For instance, there might be confounding factors that are not included 
in our specification and they might affect the key measures, and there might be pretrends in the 
data that we could mislabel as treatment effects. To alleviate these concerns, we construct 
robustness checks with a selected set of market condition variables, and our main results stay 
similar.  We also examine our data for pretrends, and find no evidence in this direction. The second 
limitation of our study is that even though we provide supportive evidence for the mechanisms of 
the positive and negative indirect effects in 2007 and 2005, we can never be completely sure about 
the exact mechanisms leading to the changes in the short aggressiveness, and we are open to 
criticisms. The purpose of the study is to show that there might be indirect effects in randomized 
pilot programs, and we believe that we achieve this goal.  
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses estimation methodology, and 
Section 3 introduces the data.  We present the empirical results on shorting aggressiveness in 
Section 4. Section 5 reports empirical results on market quality measures and returns. Section 6 
concludes with some advice for those designing regulatory experiments in the future.
 
2. Estimation Methodology 
2.1 Defining Direct and Indirect Effects 
We adopt the potential outcomes framework of Rubin (1974), and we most closely follow 
the notation of Hudgens and Halloran (2008).  Assume that there are N firms, and let ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ , ߰ሻ be 
a random variable reflecting the potential outcome for firm i given its own treatment ௜ܶ. In our 
case, the treatment is binary, with ௜ܶ= 1 if firm i is subject to the regulatory change, and ௜ܶ= 0 
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otherwise.  The fraction of firms treated in the randomized treatment assignment strategy is 
denoted by ߰. Taking expectations of the outcome variable, the individual direct treatment effect 
can then be defined as: 
ܦܧ௜ሺ߰ሻ ൌ 	ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߰ሻ–	 ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻሿ.      (1) 
Recall that a single firm is either treated or not, so we observe only one of these quantities.  The 
other is an unobserved counterfactual.  Nevertheless, these potential outcomes can be averaged 
across the N firms to give the average direct treatment effect: 
ܦܧሺ߰ሻ 	ൌ 	∑ ܦܧ௜ሺ߰ሻே௜ୀଵ 	ൌ 	∑ ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߰ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻሿ,ே௜ୀଵ   (2) 
for a given treatment strategy ߰.  If firms are chosen randomly for treatment, the direct treatment 
effect can be estimated as the average outcome for treated firms less the average outcome for 
untreated firms.   
Note that a treatment strategy ߰  is often compared to an alternative treatment, ߶ . To 
compare two treatment strategies ߰ and ߶, we seek to measure the overall treatment effect: 
ܶܧሺ߰, ߶ሻ 	ൌ ෍ ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߰ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߶ሻሿ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
ൌ ෍ ܧሼሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߰ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻሿ ൅ ሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻ െ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߶ሻሿሽ
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
																					ൌ ܦܧሺ߰, ߶ሻ ൅ ܫܧ௜ሺ߰, ߶ሻ.       (3)  
The first difference in the summation should be familiar as the direct treatment effect, and we can 
define the second difference in the summation to be the indirect treatment effect. This has the 
natural interpretation as the indirect effect or spillover on an untreated firm from changing the 
overall treatment strategy from ߶ to ߰.  In economics, the indirect effect is sometimes called a 
treatment externality or general equilibrium effect, while in statistics, this effect is often referred 
to as interference.  If the SUTVA holds, that is, if a unit’s outcomes are unaffected by another 
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unit’s treatment assignment, then the indirect effect should be zero. But if the SUTVA assumption 
is violated, then the indirect effect might be nonzero, and inference based only on the direct effect 
might be biased. 
2.2 Our Model Specification 
Estimation of direct and indirect effects is the easiest when there are many different groups 
of subjects, with only within-group spillovers. Identification of direct and indirect treatment effects 
is then obtained by varying the fraction treated across groups. The problem in financial regulatory 
settings is that there is usually only one group or one financial market.  This makes it more difficult 
(but not impossible) to identify indirect or indirect effects. In the case of the Reg SHO pilot, we 
obtain identification using observations immediately before and after changes in the treatment 
policy along with control variables.   
Given random assignment, each term of the direct effect can be consistently estimated 
using the mean time-series difference for the firms assigned to that group.  That is, for the treated 
group (Ti = 1), for each variable Yi under investigation, we have: 
ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߰ሻሿ ൌ ܧൣ ௜ܻ௉ைௌ்ห	 ௜ܶ ൌ 	1, ߰	ሿ	– 	ܧሾ ௜ܻ௉ோா	|		 ௜ܶ ൌ 1, ߶ሿ,   (4) 
and similarly for the untreated group (Ti = 0): 
ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻሿ ൌ ܧൣ ௜ܻ௉ைௌ்ห	 ௜ܶ ൌ 	0, ߰	ሿ	– 	ܧሾ ௜ܻ௉ோா|		 ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߶ሿ,	   (5) 
where the two subtracted terms are the same in expectation due to randomization before treatment 
begins. Thus, in a randomized setting such as the Reg SHO pilot, an estimator for the direct effect 
is the standard difference-in-difference estimator.   
Now consider the indirect effect. If ߰ corresponds to the post-event treatment situation and 
߶ is pre-event, then this can be estimated as the average change in the outcome variable for control 
stocks: 
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ܧሾ ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߰ሻ–	 ௜ܻሺ ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߶ሻሿ ൌ ܧൣ ௜ܻ௉ைௌ்ห	 ௜ܶ ൌ 	0, ߰ሿ	– 	ܧሾ	 ௜ܻ௉ோா|		 ௜ܶ ൌ 0, ߶ሿ.  (6) 
At the beginning of the pilot in 2005, one-third of Russell 3000 stocks are selected for the 
regulatory treatment, essentially at random (߰ = 1/3). Before the partial repeal begins, we measure 
outcome variables for pilot and non-pilot stocks, and at this time no firms are being treated, so ߶ 
= 0.  After the partial repeal starts, we again measure the average outcome variables for both pilot 
and non-pilot stocks with ߰ = 1/3.  For the full repeal of the uptick rule in 2007, before the event, 
1/3 of the firms are treated, and after the repeal, all firms are treated. That is, ߶ = 1/3 and ߰ = 1. 
For comparison purposes, even though our main results are about the full uptick repeal in 2007, 
we also study the partial uptick repeal in 2005. To avoid confusion between the two settings, we 
always define the 1/3 pilot firms to have Ti = 1, and the 2/3 non-pilot firms to have Ti = 0. 
We estimate our direct and indirect effects through the standard difference-in-difference 
specification:  
௜ܻ௧ ൌ 	β଴ ൅ βଵܣ௧ ൅ βଶ ௜ܶ ൅ βଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߝ௜௧.     (7) 
Variable ܣ௧ is an indicator variable that equals one if and only if the randomized treatment has 
occurred. The interaction term βଷ  measures the direct treatment effect, and the coefficient βଵ 
measures the indirect treatment effect.  Equivalently, the indirect effect is the average change in 
control firm outcome moving from the old to the new treatment strategy. Most studies using 
difference-in-difference focus on the direct effect, βଷ, while our paper emphasizes the importance 
of the indirect effect, βଵ. 
For the 2005 partial repeal of the uptick rule, our specification is defined as in equation (7). 
For the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule, we conduct a simple linear transformation of equation 
(7), because we set Ti = 1 for pilot firms, which now become the control group, and Ti = 0 for non-
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 10
pilot firms, which now are the treatment group. In this case, the direct effect on the treatment group 
becomes െβଷ , and the indirect effect becomes βଵ൅βଷ. 
Unfortunately, if anything else comes along during the experiment and affects all firms at 
the same time, such as changes in proverbial “market conditions”, this would confound estimates 
of the indirect effect.  There is no panacea for the issue of confounding factors. A common 
approach is to augment the difference-in-difference specification with a vector of control variables 
Xit that captures the changes in these market conditions: 
௜ܻ௧ ൌ 	β଴ ൅ βଵܣ௧ ൅ βଶ ௜ܶ ൅ βଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ γ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧.     (8) 
These controls can usually be reduced from firm level information Xit to market level information 
Xt, based on the treatment randomization. Since our focus is on measures of short-seller 
aggressiveness as well as market quality measures, we include three market wide variables from 
the previous day to define market conditions. These three variables are the previous day’s VIX (an 
implied volatility index based on option prices), market-wide liquidity measured using the 
previous day’s cross-sectional average effective spread (twice the distance between the trade price 
and the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the trade, scaled by that quote midpoint, variable 
mktres), and a market-wide price efficiency measure calculated as the previous day’s cross-
sectional average AR1 coefficient (the absolute value of the AR(1) coefficient in a daily time-
series regression of 30-minute quote midpoint returns, variable mktar). 
The purpose of including control variables is to use them as proxies for potential 
confounding factors, while the choices can be subjective. The usual arguments against the control 
variable approach include concerns on exogeneity (whether the controls are really exogenous in 
the regression), appropriateness (whether the controls are really relevant for the dependent 
variable), and completeness (whether we exhaust all the important confounding factors). Since 
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 11
there is no theoretical guidance on identifying the “confounding factors”, there is no perfect 
solution to this issue. Here we consider including three commonly used market wide variables that 
affect short aggressiveness as a reasonable, but possibly imperfect solution.4   
Finally, as discussed in Bertrand et al (2004), the standard errors in difference-in-difference 
regressions can be biased.  Thus, all t-statistics for the panel regressions are double-clustered by 
date and firm.  Because double clustering does not guarantee positive definiteness of the variance-
covariance matrix, when the corresponding double-clustered standard error is not available, we 
conduct inference using the standard errors clustered by firm.5 
 
3. Data 
For the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule, our main sample includes the period from 20 
trading days before to 20 days after the uptick repeal became effective on July 6, 2007. We 
specifically choose a short 20-day window around the event to minimize potential impact from the 
August 2007 Quant Meltdown, as discussed in Lo and Khandani (2011). To further account for 
any market-wide changes in that period, we rely on difference-in-difference regressions with 
market condition controls.  
In addition to the standard data sources, such as TAQ and CRSP, we have all NYSE system 
order data records related to short sales for this period.  Because we have data on all short-sale 
orders placed, not just executed short sales, we can measure order aggressiveness based on the 
placement of short-sale orders relative to the existing bid and ask prices. We match firms with 
                                                 
4 Confounding factors can also show up in the form of pretrends, and we examine the existence of pretrends in later 
discussions. We find no evidence of pretrends in these supplemental tests.  
5 We thank the referee for this suggestion. For all numbers presented in Table 2 to Table 4, double-clustered standard 
errors can always be computed. For results in Table 7, there are 4 out of 72 cases where the double-clustered errors 
were unable to be computed, and for these 4 cases, we use the standard errors clustered by firm instead. 
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CRSP and retain only NYSE-listed common stocks, which means that we exclude securities such 
as foreign stocks, warrants, preferred shares, American Depositary Receipts, closed-end funds, 
REITs, and other certificates.  We limit the sample to firms that were in the Russell 3000 index 
during 2004-2005 and were thus eligible for the SEC pilot program. This leaves us with 1,088 
NYSE-listed common stocks in the sample, of which 360 are pilot stocks and 728 are non-pilot 
stocks.   
Table 1 compares pilot and non-pilot stocks along several dimensions, including market 
capitalization, book-to-market, trading volume, shorting activity, and market quality measures. We 
report the 20-day average of the cross-sectional median for both pilot and non-pilot stocks 20 days 
before the 2007 full repeal in the left panel, and post-repeal medians in the right panel. The two 
groups (pilot and non-pilot) are very similar in terms of stock characteristics, which is not 
surprising given the original assignment algorithm for the SEC pilot program. For example, before 
the event, the average median market capitalization is $2.928 billion for pilot stocks and $3.189 
billion for non-pilot stocks.  Median daily trading volume is just under 400,000 shares for pilot 
stocks vs. about 422,000 shares for non-pilot stocks. However, characteristics for shorting are 
significantly different between pilot and non-pilot stocks in both half panels. We measure daily 
shorting flow (variable relss) as the fraction of NYSE trading volume executed in a given stock on 
a given day that involves a system short seller. Before the full repeal, 37.4% of share volume 
involves a short-seller for the average pilot stock, while the comparable figure is only 29.2% for 
non-pilot stocks, indicating that the partial repeal for pilot stocks did in fact remove a significant 
impediment to shorting. After the full repeal, 39.9% of pilot-stock share volume involves a short, 
and the comparable figure is 38% for non-pilot stocks, indicating that the shorting activity quickly 
picked up for non-pilot stocks after the full uptick repeal.    
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Our key variable in this study is shorting aggressiveness, measured two different ways.  
Our first measure is based on the average relative effective (half) spread paid by short sellers in 
stock i on day t.  That is, 
ݏ݄݋ݎݐݎ݁ݏ௜௧ ൌ ∑ ݓ௜௦ሺܯ௜௦ െ ௜ܲ௦ሻ௦∈௧ /ܯ௜௦,      (9) 
where Pis is the price at which shares are sold short at time s, Mis is the prevailing quote midpoint 
at the time of the short sale, and the weight wis is the size of the short sale, at time s, in shares 
divided by the total number of shares shorted that day in stock i.  We scale the dollar spread by the 
prevailing midpoint to generate a proportional effective spread. This measure is negative if short-
sellers provide liquidity on average, and positive if they demand liquidity on average. When short-
sellers become more aggressive, the effective spread increases.  
The second proxy for shorting aggressiveness is based on the pricing of the order relative 
to the existing quote.  Specifically, we calculate the fraction of submitted short-sale orders that are 
marketable, variable fmkt, based on the existing bid price.  These orders could be either market 
orders or limit orders to sell short where the limit price is below the existing bid, making them 
marketable.  In either case, these orders are virtually certain to be executed. Unlike the effective 
spread measure, which is computed after the trades are executed, the fraction of marketable orders 
is computed after the orders are submitted, so there is a slight difference between the two. But the 
intuition is similar: higher percentages of marketable orders indicate more aggressive shorting.6 
From the left panel of Table 1, the relative effective spread for shorts before the full uptick 
repeal is on average -2.271 basis points for pilot stocks, and -4.667 basis points for non-pilot 
stocks. The negative sign indicates that short-sellers in our sample period on average provide 
                                                 
6  The above two measures reflect different aspects of shorting aggressiveness. The variable shortres provides 
information on the average bid-ask spread, while fmkt reveals more about order distribution. We present results on 
both measures for completeness in capturing short-sellers’ behaviors. 
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liquidity to the market, and more so for non-pilot stocks. From the right panel of Table 1, the 
relative effective spread for shorts after the full repeal is on average -1.344 for pilot stocks, and 
-1.593 basis points for non-pilot stocks. After the full repeal, the relative effective spread increases 
for both pilot and non-pilot stocks, indicating that short-sellers become more aggressive towards 
all stocks.  Before the full repeal, on average 33.9% of shorts are marketable for pilot stocks vs. 
32.1% for non-pilot stocks, indicating short-sellers are slightly more aggressive towards pilot 
stocks before the full repeal. After the full repeal, these two measures become 38.5% and 37.7%, 
respectively, indicating that short-sellers become more aggressive towards both pilot and non-pilot 
stocks.   
To compare the measures before and after the uptick repeal event day by day, we present 
time-series of the cross-sectional mean of the short-sale flow and both shorting aggressiveness 
measures in Figure 1. For the shortres measure in Panel A, it is clear that, compared to non-pilot 
stocks, short sellers are more aggressive in pilot stocks before the 2007 full uptick repeal, and the 
difference quickly disappears after the full uptick repeal.  Interestingly, the shortres measure seems 
to increase for both pilot and non-pilot stocks after the full uptick repeal. For the fmkt variable, the 
difference between pilot and non-pilot stocks is not as obvious before or after the full repeal, but 
the percentage of marketable orders seems to increase for both pilot and non-pilot stocks after the 
uptick repeal. The timing of the changes closely coincides with the exact day of the rule change, 
and is not supportive of the hypothesis of a pretrend.  
Other than the shorting aggressiveness measures, we also report summary statistics on a 
few market quality measures, including the full proportional effective spread, the 5-minute price 
impact, the absolute return persistence (the absolute value of the AR(1) coefficient based on 30-
minute returns), the intraday variance of 30-minute returns, and the Hasbrouck price inefficiency 
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measure (the volatility of noise over volatility of price). All these measures have similar 
magnitudes as documented in earlier studies.  
 
4. Empirical Results on Short-Sale Aggressiveness 
Clearly, the uptick rule constrains the trading behavior of many if not most short sellers.  
While the rule is in place, short sellers cannot hit an existing bid if the resulting trade price would 
violate the uptick rule.  Given this constraint, some short sellers might comply by submitting less 
aggressive limit orders for firms with the uptick constraint.  Others might choose not to trade at 
all.  Thus, when the uptick rule is repealed, we expect to see short sellers trade more aggressively 
on firms without the uptick constraint. Comparing the start of the partial repeal pilot program in 
2005 to the full repeal in 2007, the implications for short-sellers’ aggressiveness could be quite 
different. For the partial repeal in 2005, we expect to observe more aggressive shorting in pilot 
firms, but not in non-pilot firms, because the uptick rule would still be in place for these firms. For 
the full repeal in 2007, we might observe short-sellers becoming more aggressive in the non-pilot 
firms.     
We start Section 4.1 with an analysis of changes in shorting aggressiveness around the full 
uptick repeal in 2007 to identify potential indirect effect. Section 4.2 examines shorting 
aggressiveness in 2005 with partial repeal of the uptick rule for indirect effect. Section 4.3 reports 
robustness checks on indirect effects with subgroups of firms. Section 4.4 discusses the changes 
in the intraday co-movement of stock returns and shorting activity, and provides insights on likely 
mechanisms for the indirect effect in 2005 and 2007. 
4.1 Effects of 2007 Full Uptick Repeal on Shorting Aggressiveness 
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The uptick rule directly limits the aggressiveness of short sellers, and thus shorting 
aggressiveness is the cleanest laboratory for our methodological investigation into direct and 
indirect effects of the rule change.  As discussed above, once the uptick constraint is removed, 
short sellers are free to demand or supply liquidity as they see fit. As a result of this shift away 
from supplying liquidity, we expect to see short sellers earn the bid-ask spread less often and pay 
the bid-ask spread more often.  On average, then, the bid-ask spread paid by short sellers should 
increase, and we would expect to see shorts use more marketable orders compared to limit orders.   
Table 2 provides details on shorting aggressiveness in both pilot and non-pilot stocks, 
before and after the July 6, 2007 repeal of the tick test. Estimation results with and without the 
market level controls are reported in Panel A and B, respectively. The first column of Panel A 
contains a simple difference-in-difference specification for the average effective spread paid by 
short sellers.  This specification shows that before repeal, short sellers pay -5.923 + 2.849 = -3.074 
basis points in pilot stocks, while they pay -5.923 basis points (that is, they earn 5.923 basis points 
of spread) for non-pilot stocks, where the tick test remains in effect.  The difference of 2.849 basis 
points is strongly statistically significant (t = 9.81).  This shows that short sellers are constrained 
by the tick test to supply rather than demand liquidity.  Once the tick test is repealed on July 6, the 
cross-sectional differences quickly disappear. Over the 20-day post-repeal period, short sales pay 
an average effective spread of -5.923 + 3.818 = -2.105 basis points for non-pilot stocks vs. -5.923 
+ 3.818 + 2.849 – 2.710 = -1.965 basis points for pilot stocks.  A standard difference-in-difference 
test would conclude that the July 2007 repeal of the tick test leads to more aggressive shorting in 
the affected non-pilot stocks.  Based on the results in Table 2 Panel A, the uptick repeal causes 
short sellers to pay 2.710 basis points more in effective spread, which is about half the 5.923 basis 
points that they were previously receiving (t = 13.25). 
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While the difference-in-difference approach identifies an increase in shorting 
aggressiveness, there is also evidence of an indirect effect.  After the tick test repeal, shorting 
aggressiveness increases even for the pilot stocks that were already exempt from the tick test and 
should have been unaffected by the regulatory change.  As noted above, pilot stock shorting 
receives 3.074 basis points of effective bid-ask spread before the repeal and only 1.965 basis points 
after repeal, which is 36% less.  The fact that shorting in unaffected control stocks becomes more 
aggressive is consistent with positive and significant spillover associated with the uptick repeal.  
At the bottom of Panel A, we report our estimates of the total effect, along with the direct and 
indirect treatment effects of the uptick repeal. Traditional difference-in-difference approaches pick 
up only the direct effect, which we estimate to be 2.710 basis points.  The indirect effect from 
treatment spillovers contributes an additional 1.108 basis points of shorting aggressiveness, as 
measured by effective spread, for a total treatment effect of 3.818 basis points. All three estimates 
use double-clustered standard errors and are statistically significant. That is, if we ignore the 
indirect effect, we substantially understate the increase in shorting aggressiveness associated with 
uptick repeal by 29%. 
Of course, there could be other explanations for the increase in pilot stock shorting 
aggressiveness after July 6.  Perhaps the aggressiveness of shorting activity depends on market 
conditions such as returns and volatility, and perhaps market conditions were different post-repeal.  
To investigate this possibility, we augment the difference-in-difference specification with market-
level control variables, and the results are reported in Table 2 Panel B.  The results are quite similar 
with these controls in place, and the indirect effect is slightly smaller at 0.812 basis point with a 
significant t-statistic of 2.43. 
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Our other measure of aggressiveness, the fraction of submitted short sale orders that are 
marketable, shows similar differences between pilot and non-pilot stocks. Note that short sellers 
as a group are still relatively passive traders.  Even after uptick repeal, only about 38% of their 
submitted orders are marketable, and on average they continue to earn rather than pay the spread. 
From Table 2 Panel A, the total effect on fmkt is 0.044 (t = 4.35):  the direct effect is 0.004 (t = 
1.03), and the indirect effect on pilot stocks is 0.040 (t=4.23). This indicates that overall, short-
sellers become more aggressive for both pilot and non-pilot stocks. Interestingly, the direct effect 
on non-pilot stocks is insignificant, while the indirect effect on pilot stocks accounts for most of 
the total effect and is positive and highly significant. The pattern clearly indicates that short-sellers 
become more aggressive by using more marketable orders (for both pilot and non-pilot stocks) 
after the 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule. If instead we rely on the standard difference-in-
difference approach and focus only on the direct effect, we are likely to make the inference that 
short-sale aggressiveness, measured by fmkt, is not significantly affected by the 2007 full repeal. 
When we add in market controls in Panel B, the empirical results are qualitatively similar, with t-
statistics that are smaller but still statistically significant.7 
Why would short sellers become more aggressive in the unaffected pilot stocks?  A 
possible explanation is that the uptick repeal made it easier to implement “list-based shorting,” a 
                                                 
7 To check the reliability of the double-clustered t-statistics, we conduct a placebo test, as suggested by the referee. 
For this placebo test, we choose a sample close to our main sample period that has no uptick repeal event. The placebo 
sample period is January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2007. For our main estimations in Table 2, we estimate a difference-in-
difference regression using a 40-day window around the event. For the placebo test, we estimate our difference-in-
difference regression for each 40-day window (without the event) within the placebo sample period. We obtain 
empirical distributions for the total, direct and indirect effects, by either directly ranking the estimated coefficients 
from the placebo sample or by randomly resampling the coefficients 1000 times. We compute the 95th percentile from 
both methods and compare with our sample estimates. For the 12 cases of the total, direct and indirect effect 
coefficients in Table 2, the significances of the original double-clustered t-statistics are mostly confirmed with the 
placebo tests. The 2 exceptions are the indirect effects on shortres and fmkt with market controls, where the resampling 
methodology confirms significance and the direct ranking of the parameters doesn’t. That is to say, the inference from 
the original double-clustered standard errors is mostly consistent with what we see in the placebo tests. Similar placebo 
tests are also conducted for the 2005 event, and we reach similar conclusions.  
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shorting strategy that demands liquidity and involves multiple stocks. One typical example for 
“list-based shorting” is index arbitrage. If stock index futures are cheap relative to cash market 
prices, an index arbitrageur would like to buy futures and immediately short all of the underlying 
stocks.  The arbitrageur can observe the bid and ask prices for all stocks.  If the trade is profitable 
at the existing quotes, the arbitrageur would like to hit all of the bids in the underlying stocks 
simultaneously, thereby locking in a profit.  Thus, she would like to submit simultaneous 
marketable short-sale orders for a list of stocks.  However, if the uptick rule is binding in some of 
the stocks, the index arbitrageur cannot demand liquidity in those stocks, but instead is forced to 
either supply liquidity or abstain from shorting those stocks.8  As a result, the arbitrage strategy is 
subject to considerable execution risk or tracking error in the presence of the uptick rule, so the 
index arbitrageur may not be able to implement this strategy as effectively when the uptick rule is 
in place.  Once the uptick rule is repealed, aggressive trading activity associated with an index 
arbitrage strategy may increase markedly, and we would expect to see more aggressive short sales 
in all of the underlying stocks, including pilot stocks that were already exempt from the uptick 
rule.  Similar arguments would apply for any broad list-based portfolio short-selling strategy where 
some of the stocks are freed from the uptick rule. We consider this explanation in more details in 
Section 4.4. 
4.2. Effect of 2005 Partial Uptick Repeal on Shorting Aggressiveness  
If aggressive list-based short sellers require full or near-full uptick repeal to implement 
their trading strategies, the 2005 partial uptick repeal may yield different results on shorting 
aggressiveness.  At that time, tick tests were suspended for only one-third of Russell 3000 stocks, 
which probably inhibits most such portfolio trading strategies. On the other hand, given that 
                                                 
8 Index arbitrage by registered broker-dealers is exempt from the uptick rule, see Macey, Mitchell, and Netter (1989). 
However, index arbitrage by others is subject to the uptick rule.  
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shorting constraints are eased for all pilot stocks, but not for non-pilot stocks, we might observe 
more aggressive shorting in pilot stocks, but not in non-pilot stocks.  To investigate this hypothesis, 
we first present the time-series patterns of the shorting aggressiveness measures, then we estimate 
the difference-in-difference specifications on a similarly constructed sample that extends from 20 
trading days before to 20 trading days after the 2005 partial uptick repeal.   
We report the time-series of the cross-sectional mean of the short-sale flow and both 
shorting aggressiveness measures for the 2005 partial uptick repeal in Figure 2. In Panel A, before 
May 2005, the shortres time-series for the pilot stocks and non-pilot stocks are very similar. Then 
1 day before the regulation change, the shortres time series quickly diverge, with short-sellers 
being much more aggressive towards the pilot stocks than the non-pilot stocks. The same patterns 
also exist for the fmkt measure, in the sense that the difference between pilot and non-pilot stocks 
is not as obvious before the partial repeal, but the percentage of marketable orders seems to 
increase for pilot stocks, starting from 1 day before the partial repeal.  Notice that the exact event 
date, May 2 of 2015, is pre-scheduled and public news. The finding that the shorting 
aggressiveness diverges one day before the event date indicates that some market participants start 
to trade accordingly already one day before the event. The time-series patterns in the Figure 2 
indicates that the timing of the changes almost coincide with the exact event date, and there doesn’t 
seem to be pretrends. 
The estimation results for the difference-in-difference specification are presented in Table 
3. Panel A provides results from the simple differences-in-differences specification, and Panel B 
reports results after including market-level controls.  Based on the specification without market 
condition controls in Panel A, for the 20 trading days after the pilot starts, short sellers pay an 
average effective spread of -4.287 – 1.579 = -5.866 basis points in non-pilot stocks vs. -4.287 – 
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1.579 + 0.174 + 3.517 = -2.175 basis points for pilot stocks. The estimates show that suspension 
of the uptick rule causes short sellers to reduce the effective spread that they receive by 3.517 basis 
points (t = 8.74) on pilot stocks, a reduction of about 60% from pre-pilot levels. As before, the 
standard difference-in-difference test would conclude that the 2005 partial uptick repeal leads to 
more aggressive shorting in treated pilot stocks. Results in Panel B are quite similar.  
What about the indirect effect on the non-pilot stocks?  The indirect effect is estimated at 
an economically and statistically significant -1.579 basis points (t = -2.93) in Panel A, and -1.832 
basis points (t=-3.58) in Panel B. Clearly, regardless of the specification, the indirect effect is 
statistically significant, with a magnitude close to 50% of the direct effect. That is to say, short-
sellers are significantly less aggressive towards non-pilot stocks after the 2005 partial uptick 
repeal. 
More interestingly, the indirect effect in 2005 is negative, which is the opposite to what we 
observe in 2007. Based on the direct effect, short-sellers are more aggressive for pilot stocks. Yet, 
the indirect effect, coming from non-pilot stocks, is significant and negative. This pattern clearly 
differs from the list-based trading hypothesis we proposed for 2007, and is consistent with a 
possible substitution effect. That is, short-sellers take advantage of the eased shorting restrictions 
on pilot stocks, and at least partially substitute pilot stocks for non-pilot stocks in their short 
portfolios after the partial repeal, which lead to higher aggressiveness towards pilot stocks and less 
aggressiveness towards non-pilot stocks.  
4.3.  Robustness Check on the Indirect effects: Subgroup Results 
Before we look into the potential causes of the positive indirect effect in 2007 and the 
negative indirect effect in 2005, we briefly examine the robustness of these indirect effects using 
subsamples. We consider two sets of subsamples. We first separate firms into three market 
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capitalization buckets (small, medium, and large), with each bucket containing an approximately 
equal number of these NYSE-listed stocks. The small-cap category has a median market cap of 
about $0.8 billion, the mid-cap category has a median market cap of about $3 billion, and the large-
cap category has a median market capitalization around $14.3 billion.   
Total, direct, and indirect effects are summarized by market-cap tercile in Table 4 Panel A 
for shortres and fmkt. Our focus is on the indirect effect presented at the bottom of Panel A. The 
2007 full uptick repeal in general has positive influences on short-sellers’ aggressiveness, 
indicating that full uptick repeal leads to increases in short-sellers’ aggressiveness in all firms. For 
the shortres measure, the increase ranges between 0.676 bps and 1.544 bps, with 5 out of the 6 t-
statistics being significant at the 5% level. In terms of magnitude, the increase in aggressiveness 
is higher for smaller firms. But if we compare with the magnitude of the total effect, the proportion 
of indirect effect relative to the total effect ranges between 20% (for small-cap firms) and 34% (for 
mid-cap firms), so it is not clear that the indirect effect is lower for mid and large-cap firms. For 
the fmkt measure, we also observe large and positive indirect effects. When there are no market 
level controls, the indirect effect on fmkt is always statistically significant. With market level 
controls, the indirect effect on fmkt remains highly significant for large-cap firms, but becomes 
marginally significant for mid-cap firms, and insignificant for small-cap firms. In terms of 
magnitude and significance, the indirect effect is much stronger for large-cap firms vs. small-cap 
firms. As mentioned earlier, the shortres measure and the fmkt measure reveal different aspects of 
short-sellers’ aggressiveness, and we are not surprised that there might be differences in results 
using the two measures. Overall, we find that positive indirect effects exist for all size subgroups.   
Given our discussions of index arbitrage and the fact that many institutional investors 
explicitly or implicitly track the S&P 500, another useful way to partition these stocks is based on 
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their membership in the S&P 500 index. In terms of the membership in the S&P 500 index, 371 
of our sample firms are in the S&P 500, while 771 are not.  Market cap, book-to-market, trading 
volume, short sale, and market quality statistics for the S&P 500 subsample are quite similar to 
those for the large-cap subsample, indicating that the non-S&P 500 firms are more similar to our 
small and mid-cap firms.  
Table 4 Panel B reports the total, direct and indirect effects for S&P 500 vs. non-S&P 
stocks. From the bottom of Panel B, the indirect effect is positive and large for all stocks. For the 
shortres measure, the indirect effect is always statistically significant except for non-S&P firms 
after we include the market level controls. The magnitude of the indirect effect is slightly larger 
for non-S&P firms, while as a proportion of the total effect, the S&P 500 firms have larger 
spillovers. For the fmkt measure, the indirect effect is always larger and significant for the S&P 
firms.  The stronger indirect effect for S&P 500 firms is consistent with the list-based trading 
hypothesis.  
Overall, we confirm the existence of the positive indirect effects for the 2007 full uptick 
repeal for various subgroups in this subsection. We would like to caution that “list-based trading” 
can be based on indices such as the S&P500, but could also potentially include trades based on 
industries, factors, or other indices. Therefore, we do not expect the subsample results to 
necessarily exhibit patterns among different subgroups. Instead, we use these results to provide 
more details and robustness of the indirect effect. We provide results for the 2005 partial uptick 
repeal in Appendix Table 1, and results are similar but in the opposite direction.  
4.4. Source of Indirect Effects around Uptick Repeal: Comovements 
Perhaps it is not too surprising that when a rule that limits traders’ aggressiveness in a 
specific group of stocks is repealed, those traders become more aggressive in these stocks. But it 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621598 
 24
is intriguing to find that the rule has significant influences on control stocks, which are not directly 
affected by the rule change. For the increase in pilot stocks’ shorting aggressiveness around the 
2007 full uptick repeal, our hypothesis is that traders are now better able to simultaneously short a 
portfolio of stocks.  For the decrease in non-pilot stocks’ shorting aggressiveness around the 2005 
uptick repeal, our hypothesis is that this results from a substitution effect. In this section, we look 
for direct evidence of the indirect effects by examining comovement in intraday shorting activity. 
If there is a substitution effect, we would observe less comovement in shorting activity, and if the 
list-based trading complementarity dominates, we would observe more comovement in shorting 
activity.  
We take all sample firms and partition them into pilot and non-pilot stocks.  For non-pilot 
and pilot stocks, respectively, we compute a cross-sectional average using firm level intraday 15-
minute shorting activity, measured as NYSE short-sale shares divided by overall NYSE trading 
volume during that 15-minute interval.  Based on the resulting time-series that extends from 20 
trading days before the uptick repeal to 20 trading days after, we regress average non-pilot shorting 
activity on contemporaneous pilot stock shorting activity, allowing a different slope coefficient 
after the uptick repeal. That is, we estimate the following regression: 
ݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௡௢௡௣௜௟௢௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ሺߠଵ ൅ ߠଶܣ௧ሻݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௣௜௟௢௧ ൅ ݑ௧,     (10) 
where ݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௡௢௡௣௜௟௢௧ is the intraday average shorting activity on non-pilot stocks, ݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௣௜௟௢௧ is the 
contemporaneous 15-minute average shorting activity on pilot stocks, and At is an indicator 
variable that equals one if and only if the uptick rule has been repealed.  Given that stocks have 
been assigned essentially randomly to pilot and non-pilot groups, if the uptick repeal has no 
spillover between pilot and non-pilot stocks in terms of shorting activity, we expect the 
coefficient	ߠଶ to be zero. If the 2007 full uptick repeal leads to more list-based shorting activity 
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across the board with positive indirect effects, we expect ߠଶ to be positive. If the 2005 partial 
uptick repeal leads to substitution between pilot and non-pilot shorting, we expect ߠଶ  to be 
negative. For time-series regressions as in equation (10), the standard errors are computed using 
Newey-West with five lags.  
The results on the 2007 full uptick repeal are reported on the left half of Table 5 Panel A.  
Before the full repeal in July 2007, non-pilot and pilot shorting do not co-move one-for-one, with 
an estimated slope coefficient of only 0.785 (t=18.67), significantly lower than 1.  This slope 
coefficient rises by 0.171 (t=8.11) after the July full uptick repeal. The new slope coefficient 
becomes 0.785 + 0.171 = 0.956.  The increase in shorting activity comovement is consistent with 
the list-based trading hypothesis with a strong positive indirect effect. When the full repeal is in 
place, pilot and non-pilot stocks then experience very similar time-series variation in shorting 
activity. 
In the right half of Table 5 Panel A, we present results on the 2005 partial uptick repeal. It 
is striking to observe that the results are opposite to those in Panel A. Before May 2005, the 
comovement between pilot and non-pilot stock shorting activity is 0.977, quite close to 1, 
indicating synchronous shorting when the uptick rule is applied to all stocks. However, the 
comovement in shorting activity significantly drops by 0.074 (t=-9.73), after the partial uptick 
repeal in May 2005. The lower comovement in shorting is consistent with a substitution effect.  
To better understand the timing of the comovement dynamics and to examine for pretrends, 
for each day, we regress intraday non-pilot shorting on pilot shorting, day by day,  
ݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௡௢௡௣௜௟௢௧ ൌ ߠ଴௧ ൅ ߠଵ௧ݎ݈݁ݏݏ௧௣௜௟௢௧ ൅ ݑ௧,     (11)   
where the coefficient ߠଵ௧ reflects day by day dynamics of the comovement.  We present the time-
series of the daily coefficients in Figure 3. For ease of comparison, we add in each panel the pre 
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and post event average of the estimated coefficients in the time-series plot. Panel A reports the 
daily comovement coefficients for the shorting activity comovement before and after the 2007 full 
uptick repeal. Before July 6, 2007, the daily coefficients mostly range between 0.7 and 0.9, and 
afterwards, the daily coefficients are most between 0.9 and 1.0. There is a clear increase in the 
shorting comovement coefficents after July 6, 2007. We report the daily shorting comovement 
coefficients for 2005 partial repeal in Panel B. Before May 2, 2005, the coefficients are mostly 
between 0.9 and 1.1, while afterwards, the coefficients drop to between 0.8 and 1.0. Again, there 
seems to be clear decreases in the shorting comovement after May 2, 2005. These patterns indicate 
that the timing of the comovement pattern change seems to coincide with the event, and thus there 
doesn’t seem to be pretrends.   
 Shorting is an important channel for price discovery. Once tick tests disappear, we expect 
prices to incorporate negative information more quickly via short sales.  Furthermore, if our list-
based hypothesis is correct and uptick repeal encourages more list-based trading activity, we 
should see evidence of this trading activity in share price comovements.  Next, we examine 
intraday share prices and returns to see whether the pilot and non-pilot stocks incorporate common 
information at the same time. Parallel to the shorting activity comovement regression, we estimate 
the following regression for 15-minute returns: 
ݎ݁ݐ௧௡௢௡௣௜௟௢௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ሺߠଵ ൅ ߠଶܣ௧ሻݎ݁ݐ௧௣௜௟௢௧ ൅ ݑ௧,     (12) 
where ݎ݁ݐ௧௡௢௡௣௜௟௢௧ is the intraday equal-weighted return on non-pilot stocks using quote midpoints, 
ݎ݁ݐ௧௣௜௟௢௧ is the contemporaneous 15-minute return on pilot stocks, and At is an indicator variable 
that equals one if and only if the uptick rule has been repealed. If information is incorporated into 
pilot and non-pilot stocks at the same rate, we would expect a slope coefficient of 1 in this 
regression, given that stocks have been assigned randomly to these two groups.  If the partial uptick 
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rule slows down information incorporation for non-pilot stocks relative to pilot stocks, we would 
expect ߠଵ to be below one. After the full repeal, we expect ߠଶ to be positive and the comovement 
among pilot and non-pilot stocks to increase. On the other hand, in the case of the 2005 partial 
repeal, we expect ߠଵ to be around one when the uptick rule is applied to all stocks, and ߠଶ to be 
negative when the partial uptick rule hinders shorting in non-pilot stocks, reducing the 
comovement between pilot and non-pilot stocks. 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5.  For the 2007 uptick repeal, when the partial 
uptick rule is in effect, the estimated slope coefficient ߠଵ is 0.947, significantly below 1, indicating 
that the partial uptick rule reduces price synchronicity. After the uptick rule is fully repealed, the 
slope coefficient increases by 0.077 (t=4.88), and the total slope becomes 1.024, which is 
statistically indistinguishable from unity. This implies that after the uptick rule is fully repealed, 
there is a significant increase in the comovement in prices of both pilot and non-pilot stocks, which 
is consistent with our list-based trading hypothesis. The coefficient ߠଶ  itself, which directly 
measures the influence of the uptick repeal on the comovement, is positive and significant.  
The pattern of the 2005 partial uptick repeal is in opposition to the above findings. When 
all stocks are subject to the uptick rule, before May 2005, the coefficient ߠଵ=0.971, is close to 1. 
After the partial uptick repeal, the slope coefficient decreases by 0.030 (t=-1.64), indicating that 
the existence of the partial uptick rule actually reduces the comovement between the pilot and non-
pilot stocks, which is more consistent with the substitution hypothesis. The t-statistics in Table 5 
Panel B for return comovements are in general smaller than those in Table 5 Panel A for short-
selling comovements. This might not be surprising, because the uptick rule directly affects short-
selling, and it is easier to observe significant changes in shorts around the rule changes, while 
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returns can be affected by many other factors beyond short-selling, making it more difficult to 
identify significance.  
In Figure 3 Panel C and D, we plot the day-by-day return comovement coefficients, with 
coefficients are estimated by regressing the non-pilot intraday returns on the pilot intraday returns 
each day, similar to specification in equation (11). Panel C reports day by day coefficients for 
return comovement for 2007, and Panel D reports parallel coefficients for 2005. The time-series 
of the daily coefficients for return comovements are more volatile than those of the shorting 
activity in Panel A and B, but they share similar patterns. That is, after the full repeal in 2007, 
there is a large increase in the return comovement, while after the partial repeal in 2005, there 
seems to be a large decrease in the return comovement. The timing of the changes coincides with 
the event date, and a pre-existing trend seems to be unlikely.  
In Table 6, we further investigate the comovement pattern among subgroups. Suppose we 
take the 2007 full uptick repeal as an example. In Panel A, the coefficient ߠଵ is 0.646, 0.784 and 
0.819 for small, mid and large-cap firms, and the coefficient ߠଶ is 0.222, 0.133 and 0.167 for these 
three groups of firms. All coefficients are highly significant. The comovement for small firms is 
lower than the large firms to start with, and after the full uptick repeal, the comovement between 
pilot and non-pilot stocks is much closer to 1, indicating the full uptick repeal increases 
synchronicity more for the large firms. Between the S&P 500 member firms and non-member 
firms, the S&P firms behave similar to the large firms, and the non-S&P firms are similar to the 
mid-cap and small-cap firms. In Panel B, similar patterns are observed for the comovement in 
returns. As mentioned earlier, returns are driven by more factors than just short-selling regulation 
changes, therefore the t-statistics are generally lower than those in Panel A. Results for the 2005 
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partial uptick repeal are qualitatively similar to what we observe for 2007 but in the opposite 
direction.  
The subgroup results on comovement have two implications. First, the increases 
(decreases) in the comovement in 2007 (2005) further confirm that the positive (negative) indirect 
effect exists for all subgroups. Second, the increases in comovements in 2007 are consistent with 
the list-based trading hypothesis for all subgroups, and the decreases in comovements in 2005 are 
consistent with the substitution hypothesis for all subgroups. 
 
5. Other Related Results 
In the previous section, we find that the repeal of the uptick rule has both direct and indirect 
effects on shorting aggressiveness.  In this section, we examine the direct and indirect effects of 
the uptick repeal on other important variables, such as shorting volume, market quality and 
liquidity measures, and stock price. 
5.1. Effects of Uptick Repeal on Shorting Activity  
We measure shorting activity in a given stock using relss, the NYSE short sale volume 
over total NYSE trading volume in that stock, which has been used in several papers, including 
Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008). We first present the time-series of cross-sectional mean of relss 
in Panel C of Figure 1. Before the 2007 full uptick repeal, pilot stocks have more shorting activity 
than non-pilot stocks. The difference in activity quickly narrows after the full uptick repeal. 
Interestingly, shorting activity for both the pilot and non-pilot stocks increases after the uptick 
repeal.  
 Table 7 Panel A summarizes the direct and indirect effects both with and without market-
level controls for the 2007 uptick repeal. Based on the specifications without controls, uptick 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621598 
 30
repeal causes shorting to increase by a total of 8.7% relative to total trading volume.  The standard 
difference-in-difference test would uncover only the direct effect, which we estimate at 6.3%, 
leaving an indirect or indirect effect of 2.3%.  However, when we estimate the model with market-
level controls, the indirect effect is no longer statistically discernible.9  
In comparison, Table 7 Panel B estimates the direct and indirect effects of the May 2005 
start of the Reg SHO pilot on shorting activity.  In that case, the indirect effect is indistinguishable 
from zero both with or without control variables included.  The direct effect is also much smaller 
at 2.6 percentage points.  Perhaps the effect is smaller simply because there is considerably less 
shorting in 2005.   
5.2.   Effects of uptick repeal on market quality measures 
What should we expect in terms of liquidity and volatility, both of which are essential 
market quality measures?  If the uptick rule forces some short sellers to supply liquidity rather than 
demand it, the uptick rule might be mechanically associated with more liquid markets, as measured 
by bid-ask spreads or depths.  If short sellers are differentially informed and the uptick rule causes 
a change in the amount of shorting, this could also affect liquidity. For volatility, with less trading 
constraint and trader might choose to trade more aggressively, so we expect the volatility to 
                                                 
9 The specification with market controls has its own caveat. From unreported coefficients, the important control 
variable appears to be the previous day’s market-wide effective spread.  The amount of shorting is positively related 
to spreads, and this seems to account for the increase in shorting activity in control stocks.  However, unlike the 
randomized grouping of stocks into pilot vs. non-pilot, variation in market-wide liquidity is endogenous, and in fact 
it is possible that the change in liquidity is caused by the final repeal of the uptick rule.  Some commentators, including 
the CNBC commentator Jim Cramer, argue that uptick repeal is in fact responsible for some of the observed post-
repeal decline in market quality.  In that case, these control variables would be undesirable, as using them would mean 
throwing out some or all of the indirect effect baby with the bath water.  Should we include the controls or not?  
Ultimately, we do not attempt to give a definitive answer, nor do we draw a conclusion as to whether uptick repeal 
causes spillover effects in terms of the amount of shorting.  The discussion here is simply intended to highlight the 
issues and difficulties associated with measuring indirect effects. 
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increase.  Diether, Werner, and Lee (2009) find that the 2005 pilot program to suspend price tests 
in the U.S. slightly worsens some measures of market quality. 10 
Here we briefly examine a few market quality measures to see if the results from the full 
uptick repeal in 2007 match the results from the partial uptick repeal in 2005.  For each NYSE 
common stock each day, we calculate several market quality measures, such as the effective spread 
(twice the distance between the trade price and the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the 
trade, scaled by the prevailing quote midpoint), price impacts (the change in the quote midpoint in 
basis points five minutes after each signed trade), absolute return persistence (the absolute value 
of the AR(1) coefficient in a daily time-series regression of 30-minute quote midpoint returns), the 
intraday variance (variance of 30-minute quote midpoint returns) and a price inefficiency measure 
(the variance of the temporary component divided by the total price variance as in Hasbrouck 
(1993)). According to Diether et al (2009), the 2005 partial repeal worsens some of the market 
quality measures. If our results are consistent with the earlier finding, we expect that the direct 
liquidity measures, such as effective spread, price impact, AR coefficient to increase, as well as 
direct volatility measures, such as intraday volatility and Hasbrouck measure. Given the diversify 
of our liquidity and volatility measures, we insert a line in Table 7 to show the expected signs of 
each coefficients for worse market quality for clarity. 
Take the effective spread in Panel A of Table 7 as an example.  Since the uptick rule is in 
place for only the non-pilot stocks in 2007, we expect non-pilot stocks subject to the rule to have 
narrower effective spreads than pilot stocks before the full repeal, all else equal.  Once the uptick 
rule is fully repealed, we expect to see a widening of non-pilot stock effective spreads so as to 
                                                 
10 Beber and Pagano (2013) and Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2013) show that short sale bans strongly degrade equity 
market quality such as liquidity and volatility, but bans impose much more severe restrictions on shorting compared 
to price tests.  In particular, shorting bans may limit market-making, thereby worsening liquidity. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621598 
 32
match the pilot stock effective spreads.  Without market controls in the left half panel of Panel A, 
we find the direct effect of the 2007 uptick repeal on the effective spread are 0.591, with a 
significant t-statistic. With market control in the right half panel, the direct effect become 0.592, 
still significant. Regardless of the specification chosen, the direct effect on liquidity is clear: repeal 
of the uptick rule somewhat worsens market liquidity, as measured by widening effective spreads. 
This matches the findings of other researchers from the start of the pilot in 2005, and the 
interpretation is fairly straightforward.  In some situations, the uptick rule impedes liquidity 
demand by short sellers and forces them to supply liquidity if they want to trade.  Repealing the 
uptick rule reverses this artificial liquidity supply.   
However, the indirect effect is important, as it could indicate that there is more going on 
than this simple story. Without market controls, the indirect effect of the 2007 uptick repeal on the 
effective spread is 0.831 and highly significant; while with market control, the indirect effect 
become -0.040 and insignificant. Given different results with and without the market condition 
controls, we want to be cautious about our interpretation. Among the market condition controls, 
the lagged market-wide effective spread is correlated with the dependent variable, the effective 
spread, because of time-series persistence, which gives a reason to prefer the results without those 
controls. If so, results without the market condition controls reveal a large, positive and significant 
indirect effect, indicting worsening market liquidity. As before, our main purpose is to highlight 
the existence of these indirect effects and discuss the methodological issues associated with their 
estimation. 
Similar findings exist for the price impact measure and the intraday volatility measure, 
indicating worsening market liquidity and larger market volatility. The results on autoregressive 
coefficients and Hasbrouck measures are mostly insignificant.  
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5.3.  Effects of Uptick Repeal on Stock Prices 
In terms of share price levels and returns, theoretical models with differences in beliefs 
predict that stock prices should be higher when there are constraints on short sales. In these models, 
shorting restrictions mean that pessimists are shut out of the market, and optimists do not take into 
account the absence of pessimists in setting prices.  If the truth is somewhere in between the 
optimists and pessimists, prices are too high.  Examples of such models include Miller (1977), 
Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Duffie, Garleanu and Pedersen (2002).11  When short sellers’ 
information is not incorporated into prices because shorting is costly, difficult, or prohibited, the 
evidence indicates that stocks can get overvalued.12  Looking at the imposition or removal of short 
sale price tests, Rhee (2003) finds some evidence of price effects in Japan following the imposition 
of an uptick rule there.  Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009) find during the 2005 pilot program, 
returns and volatility at the daily level are unaffected. On the other hand, Grullon, Michenaud, and 
Weston (2015) find a price effect in the weeks before the list of pilot stocks is announced on July 
28, 2004.13 As implied by Miller (1977), stock price effects should appear on the effective date of 
the new regulatory regime.  In this case, the SEC announces on June 13, 2007 that short-sale price 
tests would be prohibited, with an effective date of July 6, 2007.  And of course, if agents have 
completely rational expectations and common valuations or if the uptick rule does not impede 
short sellers, repeal of the uptick rule should have no effect on share prices.   
                                                 
11 In contrast, if all agents have rational expectations, as in Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), they do not agree to 
disagree, and shorting prohibitions do not cause stock prices to be biased on average. 
12  See, for example, Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2002) for evidence of 
overvaluation around spinoffs.  Pontiff (1996) provides similar evidence for closed-end funds.  Jones and Lamont 
(2002) show that in the 1920’s and 1930’s, stocks that were expensive to short had abnormally low future returns, 
even after accounting for shorting costs. 
13 See also Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), who show that the introduction of listed options on a given stock eases 
shorting constraints and reduces share prices slightly.  Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007) find price effects in Hong Kong 
when specific stocks are designated as eligible for shorting.  
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Figure 4 shows the cumulative returns on the overall stock market over this time period as 
well as the differential return on pilot vs. non-pilot stocks. If the shorting constraints models are 
correct, non-pilot stocks should fall on the news of the uptick rule repeal, at least relative to the 
control group of unaffected pilot stocks.  The figure shows the cumulative return of pilot less non-
pilot stocks.  This return should be positive if the shorting constraint models are correct, the uptick 
rule actually restricts informed short sellers, and the announcement of the repeal is unanticipated.  
The confidence bounds are approximately two standard errors in either direction, using a daily 
standard deviation of the pilot vs. non-pilot value-weighted portfolio return difference of 0.15% 
based on returns up to that date in 2007.  On announcement, the pilot vs. non-pilot return difference 
is virtually zero, and in fact non-pilot stocks slightly outperform over a longer holding period 
through the end of August 2007.  Similarly, little happens immediately around the effective date 
of July 6, 2007.  The pilot vs. non-pilot return difference is again indistinguishable from zero. 14  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we discuss potential treatment spillovers in Reg SHO pilot programs and 
other financial regulatory experiments.  The upshot is that randomization into treatment and 
control firms does not yield ideal results if the regulatory treatment results in externalities, 
behavioral responses, or general equilibrium effects that alter outcomes for control stocks.  If 
control stocks are affected by the regulatory pilot, then different econometric techniques are 
required to discern the various effects caused by the regulatory change.   
                                                 
14 These results differ from those found by Grullon et al. (2015) at the start of the pilot.  It could be that this action 
was not really news to the market.  Most observers expected the repeal of the uptick rule at some point, though the 
exact timing remained uncertain.  It could also be that while the uptick rule might affect liquidity providers, quant 
funds, and other short-term traders, it has little effect on long-term fundamentals-based shorting strategies.  In fact, at 
a 2006 roundtable hosted by the SEC, one fundamentals-based hedge fund manager characterized the uptick rule as 
only a “minor nuisance” in taking short positions. 
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In particular, we study the July 6, 2007 full repeal of the uptick rule that limited short sales 
on the NYSE.  Some stocks were already exempt from the uptick rule due to an SEC pilot program 
begun in 2005 (the partial uptick repeal).  We use these pilot stocks as a control group, presumably 
unaffected by the regulatory change.  The remaining stocks were affected by the repeal, and we 
use these non-pilot stocks as the treatment group.  When the full repeal takes effect, short-sale 
orders on average become more aggressive in both affected and unaffected stocks, which indicates 
a positive indirect effect. It is possible that when shorting impediments, the uptick rule, are eased 
for all stocks, it facilitates more list-based shorting in both pilot and non-pilot stocks, which leads 
to the positive indirect effect. We provide supporting evidence that the comovement in shorting 
activities and returns between pilot and non-pilot stocks becomes significantly higher after the full 
uptick repeal.  
In comparison, we also apply our methodology to the partial uptick repeal in 2005, and we 
find an opposite, significantly negative indirect effect. Possibly when partial repeal removes a 
shorting impediment for pilot stocks, short-sellers would favor these stocks over the non-pilot 
stocks, and the negative indirect effect is likely driven by substitution between pilot and non-pilot 
stocks. We find that the comovement between pilot and non-pilot stocks is significantly lower after 
the partial uptick repeal, which supports the substitution hypothesis. 
Fortunately, these indirect effects do not sharply degrade market quality in the 2007 full 
uptick repeal.  Overall, uptick repeal causes market liquidity to worsen slightly, and prices 
incorporate common factor information more quickly.   
The possibility of treatment spillovers provides a cautionary tale for those designing 
regulatory experiments.  We do not mean to dissuade regulators and other policymakers from 
pursuing regulatory experiments.  Randomized pilot programs remain the cleanest way to evaluate 
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the effects of rule changes, and we hope the current trend toward more such trials continues.  
However, pilot planners should think carefully about how a pilot might affect control stocks or 
firms.  Designers probably should look for potential externalities, behavioral responses by 
investors in control stocks or management of control firms, or other general equilibrium effects. 
For example, the SEC has embarked on a pilot program that changes the minimum tick and 
related rules for a subset of small-cap stocks, all in an effort to identify market structure alterations 
that might improve liquidity in this notoriously illiquid sector of the market.  To be eligible for the 
pilot, firms must have a market cap of at most $3 billion, a share price of at least $2, and average 
daily trading volume of at most one million shares.  Approximately 1,200 stocks are included in 
the pilot, divided into three test groups.  One test group is quoted in minimum increments of $0.05.  
A second test group also places restrictions on trade prices and requires internalizers of retail order 
flow to provide a minimum price improvement of $0.005.  A third group would also impose a so-
called “trade-at” rule, requiring off-exchange trades to provide significant price or size 
improvement.  There is also a control group of about 1,400 stocks.  Unlike the Reg SHO pilot, 
portfolio trading effects are probably not particularly important for this particular regulatory 
experiment.  But there could be important substitution effects.  For example, some investors might 
move their trading activities from one group to the other, either from control stocks to treatment 
stocks, or from treatment stocks to control stocks.  Alternatively, traders and investors might move 
into or out of the entire illiquid small-cap sector due to the pilot.  Pilot designers and researchers 
should take these possibilities into account; otherwise, it may prove difficult to draw conclusions 
from the resulting data. 
In addition, our approach has wide applicability in finance research, largely due to the 
prominence of the difference-in-difference methodology.  In fact, we find 122 papers in the top 
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three finance journals between 2006 and 2015 that apply some sort of difference-in-difference 
methodology.  To what extent are our concerns about potential spillovers and estimation approach 
relevant for these studies?  For illustration, we pick two types of regulation changes as examples.  
The first type includes tax rate changes, such as the tax cut in the U.S. dividend tax rate (Brown, 
Liang and Weisbenner (2007)), tax rate changes for capital gains (Morellec and Schurhoff (2010)) 
and other tax changes around the world (Becker, Jacob and Jacob (2013)). For example, the 
dividend tax directly affects firms paying dividends.  These firms could be expected to change 
their payout policies.  However, firms that do not pay dividends may also alter their payout 
policies, i.e., begin to pay dividends.  Such an indirect effect could arise if, for example, more 
investors prefer dividends after the tax cut.   Changes to trading rules could also have spillovers. 
One example is the 2008 shorting ban on financial firms, which directly restricted shorting of 
financial stocks.  In this case, the regulation change could also affect trading behavior in non-
financial firms.  For example, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) show that the ban has a 
significant impact on overall liquidity, trading volume, and volatility, suggesting that the ban 
indeed has an indirect effect on non-financial firms.    
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table reports the time-series mean of the cross-sectional median of daily firm characteristics for our sample of NYSE-listed common stocks, 
over the 20 trading days before and after the uptick rule repeal on July 6, 2007. The daily share volume is the NYSE volume. The daily measure of 
shorting activity, relss, is NYSE short sale volume over NYSE trading volume. Variable shortres is the relative effective spread for short sales only. 
Variable fmkt is the fraction of short sale orders that are marketable.  The relative effective spread, res, is the full proportional effective spread. The 
relative price impact, rpi, is the 5-minute price impact.  Absolute return persistence, ar, is computed for each stock-day as the absolute value of the 
AR(1) coefficient based on 30-minute returns. The intraday variance (intrav) is computed with 30-minute returns. The Hasbrouck price inefficiency 
measure (hasb) is the volatility of noise over volatility of price.  For each measure, we report statistics for RegSHO non-pilot firms and pilot firms.  
 Before July 6th, 2007 After July 6th, 2007 
  pilot non-pilot pilot non-pilot 
Number of firms 360 728 359 725 
Market cap ($billions) 2.928 3.189 2.812 3.172 
Book-to-market 0.424 0.423 0.438 0.431 
Daily share volume (millions) 0.399 0.422 0.469 0.503 
Shorts share volume/ total share volume, relss  0.374 0.292 0.399 0.380 
Relative effective spread for short sale orders only (bps), shortres -2.271 -4.667 -1.344 -1.593 
Fraction of marketable shorts, fmkt 0.339 0.321 0.385 0.377 
Relative effective spread (bps), res 4.844 4.608 5.381 5.643 
Relative price impact  (bps), rpi 0.781 0.773 0.892 0.930 
Absolute return persistence, ar 0.215 0.215 0.220 0.221 
Intraday variance  (bps), intrav 0.090 0.089 0.160 0.171 
Hasbrouck price inefficiency, hasb 0.058 0.061 0.053 0.055 
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Table 2. Diff-in-diff regressions around July 2007 uptick repeal 
In this table, we report coefficients for regressions of the form: 
 ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
Event dummy At takes a value of 1 for dates after July 6, 2007, and 0 otherwise.  The treatment dummy Ti 
takes a value of 1 for firms in the pilot program, and 0 otherwise. Each regression is estimated for two 
different dependent variables. The first dependent variable shortres is the relative effective spread for short 
sales only. The second dependent variable fmkt is the fraction of short sale orders that are marketable. Panel 
A reports results without controls.  Panel B includes the following market-level controls Xt-1: VIX, average 
firm level relative effective spread (mktres), and average firm level absolute return persistence (mktar). All 
market level controls are measured from the previous day. The regressions are estimated over days [-20, 
+20] around July 6, 2007. The total effect is measured by 1, the direct effect is measured by –3, and the 
indirect effect is measured by 1 + 3. T-stats are computed using standard errors double-clustered by date 
and firm.  
Panel A. Without control variables 
Dep. Var. shortres  fmkt  
  coef. t(DC) coef. t(DC) 
 -5.923 -18.55 0.335 55.78 
1 3.818 9.67 0.044 4.35 
2 2.849 9.81 0.010 2.74 
3 -2.710 -13.25 -0.004 -1.03 
R-square 0.04  0.04  
# obs. 41,785  41,395  
Total effect 3.818 9.67 0.044 4.35 
Direct effect 2.710 13.25 0.004 1.03 
Indirect effect 1.108 3.64 0.040 4.23 
 
Panel B. With market level control variables 
Dep. Var. shortres  fmkt  
  coef. t(DC) coef. t(DC) 
 -8.153 -6.45 0.264 7.54 
1 3.522 8.85 0.030 2.90 
2 2.850 9.81 0.010 2.74 
3 -2.710 -13.24 -0.004 -1.04 
Vix -0.323 -3.74 -0.007 -3.01 
Mktres 1.027 3.77 0.029 4.27 
Mktar 1.693 0.83 -0.060 -1.01 
R-square 0.04  0.06  
# obs. 41,785  41,395  
Total effect 3.522 8.85 0.030 2.90 
Direct effect 2.710 13.24 0.004 1.04 
Indirect effect 0.812 2.43 0.026 2.67 
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Table 3. Difference-in-difference regressions around May 2005 pilot start 
In this table, we report coefficients for regressions of the form: 
  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧.   
Event dummy At takes a value of 1 for dates after May 2, 2005, and 0 otherwise.  The treatment dummy Ti 
takes a value of 1 for firms in the pilot program, and 0 otherwise. Each regression is estimated for two 
different dependent variables. The first dependent variable shortres is the relative effective spread for short 
sales only. The second dependent variable fmkt is the fraction of short sale orders that are marketable. Panel 
A reports results without control variables.  Panel B includes the following market-level controls Xt-1: VIX, 
average firm level relative effective spread (mktres), and average firm level absolute return persistence 
(mktar). All market level controls are measured from the previous day. The regressions are estimated over 
days [-20, +20] around May 2, 2005. The total effect is measured by 1 + 3, the direct effect is measured 
by 3, and the indirect effect is measured by 1. T-stats are computed using standard errors double-clustered 
by date and firm.  
Panel A. Without control variables 
Dep. Var. shortres  fmkt  
  coef. t(DC) coef. t(DC) 
 -4.287 -8.92 0.452 56.53 
1 -1.579 -2.93 -0.028 -2.52 
2 0.174 0.46 0.001 0.18 
3 3.517 8.74 0.018 3.73 
R-square 0.01  0.01  
# obs. 42,881  42,910  
Total effect 1.939 3.27 -0.010 -0.97 
Direct effect 3.517 8.74 0.018 3.73 
Indirect effect -1.579 -2.93 -0.028 -2.52 
 
Panel B. With market level control variables 
Dep. Var. shortres  fmkt  
  coef. t(DC) coef. t(DC) 
 -1.583 -0.40 0.403 4.46 
1 -1.832 -3.58 -0.034 -2.84 
2 0.175 0.46 0.001 0.18 
3 3.516 8.74 0.018 3.72 
Vix -0.577 -2.64 -0.009 -1.83 
mktres 0.501 1.07 0.016 1.45 
Mktar 2.200 0.33 0.069 0.44 
R-square 0.01   0.01   
# obs. 42,881  42,910  
Total effect 1.684 2.79 -0.016 -1.43 
Direct effect 3.516 8.74 0.018 3.72 
Indirect effect -1.832 -3.58 -0.034 -2.84 
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Table 4. Total, direct and indirect effects of the July 2007 uptick repeal, subgroup analysis 
Based on regressions of the form: ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
Event dummy At takes a value of 1 for dates after July 6, 2007, and 0 otherwise.  The treatment dummy Ti takes a value of 1 for firms in the pilot 
program, and 0 otherwise. Each regression is estimated for two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable shortres is the relative 
effective spread for short sales only. The second dependent variable fmkt is the fraction of short sale orders that are marketable. The left half panel 
reports results without controls. The right half panel includes the following market-level controls Xt-1: VIX, average firm level relative effective 
spread (mktres), and average firm level absolute return persistence (mktar). All market level controls are measured from the previous day. Panel A 
divides the NYSE-listed sample into three market-cap terciles; Panel B partitions based on membership in the S&P 500.  The regressions are 
estimated over days [-20, +20] around July 6, 2007. The total effect is measured by 1, the direct effect is measured by –3, and the indirect effect is 
measured by 1 + 3. T-stats are computed using standard errors double-clustered by date and firm.   
Panel A. Size groups 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  shortres shortres shortres fmkt fmkt fmkt shortres shortres shortres fmkt fmkt fmkt 
  small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large 
Total effect coef. 6.015 2.959 2.438 0.016 0.031 0.083 5.591 2.620 2.311 0.006 0.016 0.068 
 t(DC) 7.36 11.56 12.82 1.03 3.48 9.37 6.47 10.52 13.51 0.36 1.85 7.76 
Direct effect coef. 4.471 1.944 1.619 -0.020 0.006 0.025 4.473 1.945 1.619 -0.020 0.006 0.025 
 t(DC) 8.14 12.71 13.00 -2.87 1.11 4.59 8.12 12.67 12.98 -2.85 1.11 4.57 
Indirect effect coef. 1.544 1.015 0.819 0.036 0.025 0.059 1.118 0.676 0.692 0.026 0.010 0.043 
 t(DC) 2.43 4.07 4.96 2.74 2.70 6.85 1.50 3.00 4.29 1.76 1.11 5.13 
 
Panel B. Effects by S&P500 membership 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  shortres shortres fmkt fmkt shortres shortres fmkt fmkt 
  member no member no member no member no 
Total effect coef. 2.575 4.320 0.086 0.026 2.430 3.962 0.071 0.014 
 t(DC) 12.51 8.82 9.30 2.36 12.96 7.86 7.68 1.16 
Direct effect coef. 1.666 3.132 0.025 -0.004 1.666 3.133 0.025 -0.004 
 t(DC) 16.11 11.07 4.30 -1.00 16.04 11.06 4.28 -0.98 
Indirect effect coef. 0.909 1.188 0.060 0.031 0.764 0.829 0.045 0.018 
 t(DC) 5.26 3.10 7.08 2.94 4.89 1.92 5.33 1.61 
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Table 5. Co-movements among 15-minute shorts and returns around uptick repeals 
This table reports the co-movement of returns and shorting activity (relss) before and after the uptick rule 
repeal in July 2007 and May 2005. We regress average non-pilot firms’ shorts (returns) on the average pilot 
firms’ shorts (returns), interacting with the event dummy At which takes the value of 1 after the event date, 
and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the co-movement results on shorting activity, and Panel B reports the co-
movement results on returns.  We report Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags.  Each regression has 
2,080 observations.  
Panel A. Co-movement of 15-minute shorting activities 2007 and 2005 
 2007 full uptick repeal 2005 partial uptick repeal 
 coef. t(NW) coef. t(NW) 
Pilot 0.785 18.67 0.977 91.98 
Pilot*At 0.171 8.11 -0.074 -9.73 
 
Panel B. Co-movement of 15-minute returns in 2007 and 2005 
 2007 full uptick repeal 2005 partial uptick repeal 
 coef. t(NW) coef. t(NW) 
Pilot 0.947 66.19 0.971 89.39 
Pilot*At 0.077 4.88 -0.030 -1.64 
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Table 6. Co-movements among 15-minute shorts and returns in 2007 and 2005, subgroups 
This table reports the co-movement of returns and shorting activity (relss) before and after the Reg SHO 
start in May 2005. Sample stocks are partitioned into market-cap terciles.  We regress average non-pilot 
firms’ shorts (returns) on the average pilot firms’ shorts (returns), interacting with the event dummy At 
which takes the value of 1 after May 3, 2005, and 0 otherwise. Panel A reports the co-movement results on 
shorting activity, and Panel B reports the co-movement results on returns. We report Newey-West standard 
errors with 5 lags.  Each regression has 2,080 observations.  
Panel A. Co-movement of 15-minute shorting activities 2007 and 2005 
  2007 full uptick repeal 2005 partial uptick repeal 
  coef. t(NW) coef. t(NW) 
small Pilot 0.646 8.05 0.970 53.94 
 Pilot*At 0.222 5.11 -0.050 -3.80 
medium Pilot 0.784 57.18 0.921 59.87 
 Pilot*At 0.133 12.52 -0.098 -8.80 
large Pilot 0.819 25.74 0.964 72.62 
 Pilot*At 0.167 8.84 -0.053 -5.41 
S&P Pilot 0.852 48.61 0.944 65.64 
 Pilot*At 0.155 12.14 -0.062 -6.28 
Non S&P Pilot 0.745 13.73 0.975 74.26 
 Pilot*At 0.176 6.84 -0.075 -8.09 
 
Panel B. Co-movement of 15-minute return 2007 and 2005 
  2007 full uptick repeal 2005 partial uptick repeal 
  coef. t(NW) coef. t(NW) 
small Pilot 0.879 40.67 0.917 58.70 
 Pilot*At 0.134 5.10 -0.076 -3.03 
medium Pilot 0.939 94.92 0.980 97.03 
 Pilot*At 0.042 3.18 -0.053 -2.64 
large Pilot 0.990 118.26 0.971 89.39 
 Pilot*At 0.028 2.18 -0.030 -1.64 
SP Pilot 0.973 117.16 0.990 85.59 
 Pilot*At 0.005 0.41 -0.029 -1.67 
Non SP Pilot 0.926 40.30 0.963 96.57 
 Pilot*At 0.104 4.26 -0.058 -3.19 
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Table 7. Total, direct and indirect effects for market quality measures 
Based on regressions of the form:  ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
Event dummy At takes a value of 1 for dates after the events and 0 otherwise. For Panel A, the event date is July 6, 2007; for Panel B, the event date 
is May 2, 2005. The treatment dummy Ti takes a value of 1 for firms in the pilot program, and 0 otherwise. The left half panel reports results without 
controls. The right half panel includes the following market-level controls Xt-1: VIX, average firm level relative effective spread (mktres), and average 
firm level absolute return persistence (mktar). All market level controls are measured from the previous day. The daily measure of shorting activity, 
relss, is NYSE short sale volume over NYSE trading volume. The relative effective spread, res, is the full proportional effective spread. The relative 
price impact, rpi, is the 5-minute price impact.  Absolute return persistence, ar, is computed as the absolute value of the AR(1) coefficient for a day 
of 30-minute returns. The intraday variance (intrav) is computed with 30-minute returns. The Hasbrouck price inefficiency measure (hasb) is the 
volatility of noise over volatility of price.  In Panel A, the total effect is measured by 1, the direct effect is measured by –3, and the indirect effect 
is measured by 1 + 3. In Panel B, the total effect is measured by 1 + 3 , the direct effect is measured by 3, and the indirect effect is measured by 
1. T-stats are computed using standard errors double-clustered by date and firm.    
 
Panel A. July 2007 uptick repeal 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  Relss Res Rpi Ar Intrav Hasb Relss Res Rpi Ar Intrav Hasb 
Expected sign for  
worse market quality  + + + + +  + + + + + 
total coef. 0.087 1.422 0.377 0.007 0.141 -0.011 0.067 0.552 0.136 0.004 0.000 0.000 
 t(DC) 8.75 5.23 4.06 0.57 2.76 -2.14 6.60 4.93 1.89 0.28 0.02 -0.11 
direct coef. 0.063 0.591 0.151 0.002 0.032 -0.002 0.063 0.592 0.152 0.002 0.032 -0.002 
 t(DC) 12.38 5.17 2.78 0.43 2.17 -1.07 12.36 5.18 2.78 0.43 2.15 -1.06 
indirect coef. 0.023 0.831 0.225 0.006 0.109 -0.009 0.003 -0.040 -0.016 0.002 -0.032 0.001 
 t(DC) 2.66 3.09 2.46 0.43 2.56 -1.85 0.35 -0.35 -0.25 0.17 -1.53 0.33 
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Panel B. May 2005 pilot start 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  Relss Res Rpi Ar Intrav Hasb Relss Res Rpi Ar Intrav Hasb 
Expected sign for  
worse market quality  + + + + +  + + + + + 
total coef. 0.026 0.766 -0.059 -0.005 -0.049 0.007 0.025 0.764 -0.061 -0.011 -0.058 0.008 
 t(DC) 4.64 4.71 -0.57 -0.51 -2.25 1.79 4.40 6.02 -0.68 -1.05 -3.08 2.13 
direct coef. 0.026 1.053 0.104 0.002 0.015 0.000 0.026 1.054 0.105 0.002 0.015 0.000 
 t(DC) 6.19 5.08 2.13 0.86 2.30 0.21 6.19 5.08 2.14 0.85 2.30 0.20 
indirect coef. 0.000 -0.287 -0.163 -0.007 -0.065 0.007 0.007 -0.193 -0.066 0.000 -0.010 -0.008 
 t(DC) -0.07 -1.62 -1.69 -0.79 -2.90 1.68 1.66 -0.31 -0.50 0.08 -0.70 -1.90 
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Figure 1. Key variables before and after tick test repeal in 2007  
We present the time-series of 3 key variables over days [-20, +20] around the tick test repeal on July 6, 2007. The y-axis crosses at the event day of 
July 6, 2007, so to the left, we report pre-repeal, and to the right, post-repeal. Variable shortres is the relative effective spread for shorts only. 
Variable fmkt is the fraction of short-sale orders that is marketable at the time of submission.  Shorting activity, relss, is measured each day as the 
fraction of NYSE daily share volume. Cross-sectional medians are reported for both pilot and non-pilot stocks. 
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Figure 2. Key variables before and after tick test in 2005  
We present the time-series of 3 key variables over days [-20, +20] around the tick test repeal on May 2, 2005. The y-axis crosses at the event day of 
May 2, 2005, so to the left, we report pre-repeal, and to the right, post-repeal. Variable shortres is the relative effective spread for shorts only. 
Variable fmkt is the fraction of short-sale orders that is marketable at the time of submission.  Shorting activity, relss, is measured each day as the 
fraction of NYSE daily share volume. Cross-sectional medians are reported for both pilot and non-pilot stocks.  
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Figure 3. Co-movements among 15-minute shorts and returns around uptick repeals 
This figure reports the co-movement of returns and shorting activity (relss) before and after the uptick rule repeal in July 2007 and May 2005. We 
regress average non-pilot firms’ shorts (returns) on the average pilot firms’ shorts (returns), day by day, and plot the coefficients. Panel A reports 
the co-movement results on shorting activity, and Panel B reports the co-movement results on returns.  Each daily regression has on average 26 
intraday observations.  
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Figure 4. Return response after tick test repeal.  
This figure shows cumulative returns on the overall stock market (pink line) over the uptick repeal period as well as the differential return on pilot 
vs. non-pilot stocks (blue line). We also report the confidence bounds (orange lines) for the return differentials, two standard errors in either direction, 
using a daily standard deviation of the pilot vs. non-pilot value-weighted portfolio return difference of 0.15% based on returns up to that date in 
2007.   
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Appendix Table 1. Total, direct and indirect effects of the May 2005 partial uptick repeal, subgroup analysis 
Based on regressions of the form: ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܣ௧ ൅ ߚଶ ௜ܶ ൅ ߚଷܣ௧ ௜ܶ ൅ ߛܺ௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧. 
Event dummy At takes a value of 1 for dates after July 6, 2007, and 0 otherwise.  The treatment dummy Ti takes a value of 1 for firms in the pilot 
program, and 0 otherwise. Each regression is estimated for two different dependent variables. The first dependent variable shortres is the relative 
effective spread for short sales only. The second dependent variable fmkt is the fraction of short sale orders that are marketable. The left half panel 
reports results without controls. The right half panel includes the following market-level controls Xt-1: VIX, average firm level relative effective 
spread (mktres), and average firm level absolute return persistence (mktar). All market level controls are measured from the previous day. Panel A 
divides the NYSE-listed sample into three market-cap terciles; Panel B partitions based on membership in the S&P 500.  The regressions are 
estimated over days [-20, +20] around May 2, 2005. The total effect is measured by 1 + 3, the direct effect is measured by 3, and the indirect 
effect is measured by 1. T-stats are computed using standard errors double-clustered by date and firm.  
Panel A. Size groups 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  shortres shortres shortres fmkt fmkt fmkt shortres shortres shortres fmkt fmkt Fmkt 
  small medium large small medium large small medium large small medium large 
Total effect coef. 3.836 1.174 0.948 -0.045 -0.004 0.017 3.342 1.072 0.777 -0.053 -0.009 0.013 
 t(DC) 2.63 3.48 4.04 -2.44 -0.44 2.25 2.22 3.34 3.31 -2.63 -0.93 1.73 
Direct effect coef. 6.714 2.475 1.486 -0.007 0.026 0.031 6.711 2.474 1.486 -0.007 0.026 0.031 
 t(DC) 6.10 9.03 8.26 -0.76 3.77 5.03 6.09 9.02 8.25 -0.78 3.76 5.03 
Indirect effect coef. -2.878 -1.300 -0.539 -0.038 -0.030 -0.014 -3.369 -1.402 -0.709 -0.046 -0.035 -0.018 
 t(DC) -2.55 -3.53 -2.50 -1.87 -3.11 -2.40 -3.05 -4.18 -3.34 -2.05 -3.58 -3.08 
 
Panel B. Effects by S&P500 membership 
  Regression using dummy variables only Regression using dummy variables and market controls 
  shortres shortres fmkt fmkt shortres shortres fmkt fmkt 
  member no member no member no member no 
Total effect coef. 0.708 2.377 0.527 2.096 0.009 -0.017 0.004 -0.023 
 t(DC) 3.02 3.12 2.23 2.70 1.13 -1.36 0.53 -1.71 
Direct effect coef. 1.232 4.312 1.232 4.310 0.024 0.015 0.024 0.015 
 t(DC) 7.36 8.08 7.34 8.07 3.43 2.61 3.42 2.60 
Indirect effect coef. -0.525 -1.935 -0.706 -2.214 -0.015 -0.032 -0.020 -0.038 
 t(DC) -2.32 -2.94 -3.23 -3.52 -2.24 -2.41 -2.98 -2.65 
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